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Th e phenomenological tradition has been addressing the theme of em-
bodiment from the very beginning. Indeed, Husserl was already describing 
the kinaesthetics of vision even before the Logische Untersuchungen appeared 
(see Husserliana XXII, pp. 275ff . and 416–19, for texts from around 1893 and 
1894). His lifelong investigations of the structures of embodied experience 
tended to gravitate around two main poles: on the one hand, the necessary 
role of embodiment in the constitution of our practical/perceptual world, and 
on the other hand, the necessary implication of embodiment in the experi-
ence of others. His chief fi ndings in the former context are well known, focus-
ing on the body as the central here or “null-point” (Nullpunkt) around which 
the practical/perceptual world is oriented; the kinaesthetic capability (“I-can”) 
through which I am able to “govern” (walten) my own movement in unparal-
leled immediacy; and the body as organ of perception, not only in terms of 
the various sensory fi elds through which I can experience both my own body 
and other items in the world (for example, I can see, hear, or touch myself as 
well as other things), but also in terms of the unique somaesthetic sensations 
(Empfi ndnisse) through which one and only one phenomenon is given: name-
ly, my own lived body, uniquely felt as mine. All this, however, also comes 
into play in the second major context of Husserl’s work on embodiment, for 
when I see the physical body (Körper) of another, I do not see a merely physical 
body, but a lived body (Leib) that stands at the center of its own lived world, 
that is capable of self-movement, and that is uniquely felt as “mine” by the 
person concerned. For Husserl, then, my own body participates in a “bodily 
intersubjectivity” (Husserliana IV, p. 297) arising in a pre-refl ective “coupling” 
(Paarung) between the body I live directly and the other embodied lives with 
whom I share the world.
As the tradition has developed, work on the theme of embodiment has 
continued to fl ourish, both within the phenomenological community itself 
and through interactions with thinkers and disciplines situated at various 
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distances from “classical” phenomenology. At the same time, the range of 
types of bodily experience thematized in these eff orts has continued to expand, 
whether the accent lies on description or on interpretation, and whether it is 
a question of concrete investigations focused on the phenomena in their own 
right or analyses undertaken in service of a particular philosophical problem 
or position. In the French tradition in particular, the choice of topics has 
moved well beyond Husserl’s inaugural emphasis on the most basic structural 
features of embodiment to encompass such complex and compelling issues as 
suff ering and vulnerability, nudity, eros and sexuality, and the role of the In-
carnation in Christian theology. But in addition, as the phenomenological lit-
erature on embodiment has grown ever richer, phenomenologists themselves 
have increasingly engaged in various critiques of this work, including critiques 
of its basic concepts and terminology. 
Th e initial essay in our collection provides an example of the latter type of 
contribution to the fi eld—Chris Nagel’s “Phenomenology without ‘the body’?” 
Taking the French existential-phenomenological tradition as a point of depar-
ture, he wonders whether repeated attempts to solve the ontological “mystery” 
of the body have foundered because the very term “body” inevitably reinstates 
a dualism that does violence to the lived texture of experiencing, and he off ers 
an alternative approach to embodiment in terms of his own notion of “subjec-
tion.” Now each essay in our collection was, of course, written independently 
of the other essays included here. We have nevertheless placed Nagel’s article 
fi rst in order to suggest the possibility of reading the contributions that follow 
as responses to the fi eld of questioning he opens up. And our series of possible 
responses begins with a group of essays primarily dealing with various fi gures, 
whether they are central to the phenomenological tradition or remain “periph-
eral” to it precisely because they continue to refer to it in departing from it.
Gunnar Declerck’s “Incarnation, motricité et rapport au possible” is framed 
in terms of the traditional notion that “the body” is what roots us in actuality, 
focusing fi rst of all on Husserl’s descriptions of the fundamental correlation 
between kinaesthetic capability and the horizon of potential appearances that 
are essentially connected with the currently actual appearance of the thing in 
question. Yet even if I become paralyzed, so that my freedom to move of my 
own accord is severely limited, things still appear as having other sides and the 
world retains its depth, for as the author indicates, the correlation between 
the “I-can” and a world that is explorable in principle is a genetic acquisition 
that persists even if my factual condition changes: once we have experienced 
kinaesthetic freedom, we never lose our relation to the possible. Next Diego 
D’Angelo’s “Die Schwelle des Lebe-Wesens. Überlegungen zur Leibinterpreta-
tion Heideggers in der Nietzsche-Abhandlung” takes up the transformative 
shift from “body” as a noun (Leib) to “bodying” as a verb (leiben), discussing, 
among other themes, Heidegger’s reading of the will to power in terms of the 
capability of an active, corporeal life that is always on the way, always at the 
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threshold, as a being that is always in becoming. Th en in “Signifi ance éthique 
et corporéité dans Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence,” Jan Bierhanzl ad-
dresses the way in which Levinas develops a thoroughly embodied notion of 
responsibility, tracing the trajectory of ethical signifying from the tenderness 
of the caress through the vulnerability that is already implied in the immedi-
ate contact with another’s skin to the maternal body, whose skin shelters and 
harbors another’s body, concluding with the voice exposed in a saying where 
nothing is said, a language not yet dispersed into words. 
Our collection continues with contributions focusing on further fi gures 
from the French tradition, beginning with three essays that deal, each in their 
own way, with the notion of the corps propre—my own body, lived as mine. 
Anne Gléonec’s “Corps animal et corps humain: l’‘eff acement’ de la propriété. 
À la naissance de l’instituion chez Merleau-Ponty” outlines the ontology of 
nature that Merleau-Ponty was developing in his later lectures, in order to 
show that what is proper to human embodiment is not that it is a corps propre 
by virtue of being inhabited by a “consciousness” or “rationality” that non-
human animals do not possess, but that it presents another way of being a body, 
a decentered centering, as it were, a style of behavior that is both rooted in its 
own past and radically open to an emerging future. In “Corporéité et existence: 
Patočka, Merleau-Ponty, Maine de Biran,” Emre Şan takes a diff erent approach, 
comparing Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the relation between embodiment 
and existence with Patočka’s and presenting the latter’s critical reading of Maine 
de Biran on the “fi rst-person” body of eff ort and resistance; the aim throughout 
is to show how Patočka thinks existence as movement, taking the bodily as 
the very dimension of the own—understood in terms of an embodied effi  cacy 
that is not derived by fi rst assuming some form of dualism, then attempting to 
overcome it. Still another approach is found in Luka Nakhutsrishvili’s “Corps 
propre et corps technique(s). Jean-Luc Nancy et la phénoménologie,” which 
traces Nancy’s critique of the classical phenomenological notion of the corps 
propre, demonstrating how his personal medical history allows him to speak 
not only from a uniquely situated standpoint, but as someone circumscribed 
by a predicament that demands a philosophical response; a body with a heart 
transplant, with cancer, with a failing immune system is no longer simply one’s 
“own” body, but a locus of interventions defi ned in terms of medical technolo-
gies: the “natural” is entirely replaced by the ubiquity of an “ecotechnics” to 
which the body is exposed and through which it is produced.
Th e conversation with fi gures whose relationship with the phenomeno-
logical tradition remains controversial continues with the contribution by 
Corry Shores, “Body and World in Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze”; here what 
is at stake is the contrast between Merleau-Ponty’s “integrationist” model, 
in which a habitual body, with its native synaesthesias, is geared in with a 
familiar, coherent world, and Deleuze’s appropriation of Leibniz and Spino-
za, which off ers a way to address experiences in which intense—and perhaps 
 14 Elizabeth A. Behnke, Cristian Ciocan
destructive—waves of aff ective alteration sweep through us, dislocating our cur-
rent connection with the world. Next we turn to James Mensch’s “Public Space 
and Embodiment,” which examines Arendt’s negative attitude toward the body: 
she not only sees “labor” and “work” as lower forms of human existence tied to 
bodily needs, but takes the realm of the bodily as essentially private, versus the 
higher sphere of public action carried out predominantly by speech; in con-
trast, Mensch proposes that our own situated, bodily “I-can” is not a matter of 
a merely private inwardness, but discloses and is continuous with our shared 
practical/perceptual world, including the zones of democratized political action 
embodied in the Arab Spring or in the Occupy movement. Th us the unique 
“inwardness” that is linked with a direct awareness of our own embodied life 
need not sever this life from others or from our surroundings. 
And as the following articles show, there are a number of ways in which 
bodily awareness may become thematic in the course of everyday lifeworld 
experience. In “New and Old Approaches to the Phenomenology of Pain,” 
Agustín Serrano de Haro takes up Christian Grüny’s phenomenological ac-
count of pain in light of Ortega y Gasset, Henry, and Husserl, demonstrating 
that the lived experience of undergoing pain from which one cannot escape, 
no matter how one twists and turns, is a variety of self-aff ection in which any 
sort of sensuous excess is transmuted into the intra-tactile, somaesthetic regis-
ter, affl  icting us in our most intimate depths. Th en, in “Th e Appearance of the 
Body: On Body Awareness in Combat Sports,” Alexandru Dincovici brings to 
light certain highly diff erentiated modes of bodily awareness that are swung 
into play in learning diff erent combat sports, emphasizing that such disci-
plined awareness not only changes our style of embodiment, but can modify 
the very look and sense of the world this skilled body inhabits. A diff erent 
aspect of embodied awareness is revealed in “Kinästhetisches Bewusstsein und 
sinnliche Refl exion in Tanz,” by Mónica Alarcón Dávila; here it is not a matter 
of some sort of conceptual refl ection, but of a type of truly sensuous refl exivity 
that need not be taken as ineluctably retrospective (as if a dancer would have 
to pause in order to become aware of the movements preceding the pause), 
but can inform every phase of our movement with a kinaesthetic appreciation 
of its ongoing dynamics, living it from within, in the act. 
But, as the examples drawn from sport and dance indicate, embodied aware-
ness can be honed, fi ne-tuned, developed in many directions. Th us, as Denis 
Francesconi and Massimiliano Tarozzi suggest in “Phenomenological Peda-
gogy and Embodiment: Perspectives for a Collaboration,” a potent next step 
for the Italian tradition of phenomenological pedagogy would not only involve 
integrating fi ndings from the “embodiment” paradigm in the cognitive sci-
ences, but would also embrace the kind of attentive presence or mindfulness 
in which we as sentient beings can practice truly being-there, in the fl esh, 
for the world that comes to manifestation in correlation with our embodied 
openness and attunement to it. In other words, what Marcel Mauss famously 
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called “techniques of the body” can be thematized, critiqued, and transformed 
within the very institutions that have in many ways perpetuated a Cartesian 
legacy and trained us all too well to accept an impoverished, “disconnected,” 
or disembodied way of life. But we can broaden the focus still further and 
consider the relevance of a phenomenology of embodiment in an even wider 
sphere. In “Th e Environed Body: Th e Lived Situation of Perceptual and In-
stinctual Embodiment,” Adam Konopka extends the term Resonanz, which 
Husserl uses to describe coincidence of similarity at a distance (see Husserli-
ana XI, Beilage XVIII), to include the more general notion of the associative 
intention through which objects always point beyond themselves to further 
objects (see Husserliana XI, Beilage XXV); this allows Konopka to discuss in-
stinctual drive-intentionality in terms of its conjunction with the environing 
world, understood not merely as a concordant unity, but as a nexus of refer-
ences articulated into specifi c horizons of relevance that support instinctual 
embodiment’s drive toward self-preservation. Th us here it would seem that 
embodiment and ecology must be thought together.
Nevertheless, we are living in an age of habitat loss, and this too can be 
understood in an extended sense. What is the native habitat of the body 
(Leib) lived as a verb (leiben) rather than a substance? What are the contexts, 
the environments, that might unfold, nurture, and sustain the possibilities 
of embodiment—of motility, responsivity, and awareness—that our authors 
describe? It may be the case that the web of biotechnological attitudes and in-
terventions that Jean-Luc Nancy documents is increasingly expropriating the 
“mineness” that so many phenomenologists have seen as crucial to embodi-
ment, or we may fi nd that Deleuzian shock waves of aff ective intensities are 
increasingly disrupting the concordant world so carefully described in classical 
phenomenology. However, our purpose in bringing this diverse collection of 
essays together in the present issue of Studia Phænomenologica is not to take 
sides in any debate on such issues, but to demonstrate the range and power 
of phenomenological work, which is capable not only of bringing the lived 
texture of embodiment to heightened awareness, but also of questioning the 
sedimented—and emerging—traditions that inform the shifting horizons of 
freedom within which embodiment is lived today.1
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